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Note 
 
ASTRUE v. CAPATO: RELEGATING POSTHUMOUSLY 
CONCEIVED CHILDREN TO SECOND-CLASS CITIZENS 
NICOLE M. BARNARD∗ 
[I]mposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the 
basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some rela-
tionship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.  Obviously, no 
child is responsible for his birth . . . .1 
 
In Astrue v. Capato,2 the Supreme Court of the United States ex-
amined the status of posthumously conceived children3 under the 
survivor insurance benefits provision of the Social Security Act4 (“the 
Act”). The Court upheld the Social Security Administration’s (“SSA”) 
interpretation of the provisions of the Act that allow state intestacy law 
to determine whether a posthumously conceived child qualifies as a 
“child” under the Act and, therefore, is eligible to receive federal sur-
                                                        
Copyright © 2013 by Nicole M. Barnard. 
∗ Nicole M. Barnard is a second-year student at the University of Maryland Francis 
King Carey School of Law, where she is the incoming editor in chief (2013−2014) of the 
Maryland Law Review.  She wishes to thank her husband, Thomas H. Barnard, and her 
children, Kenneth, Kyler, and Kelsie, for their unwavering support and love throughout 
law school.  She also wishes to thank Professors Michael P. Van Alstine and Lee Kovarsky 
for their wisdom, and her editors Jessica Woods, Shari H. Silver, and Christine E. White for 
their insight and suggestions in writing this Note.  Finally, the author thanks her parents, 
Paula and Maury Masucci, and her grandmother, Barbara Cira, who always instilled in her 
the courage to pursue her dreams. 
 1.  Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).  
 2.  132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012). 
 3.  A posthumously conceived child is a child who is conceived through the use of 
assisted reproductive technology “after the death of a genetic parent.”  Charles P. Kin-
dregan, Jr. & Maureen McBrien, Posthumous Reproduction, 39 FAM. L.Q. 579, 581 (2005).   
 4.  42 U.S.C. §§ 301–1397mm (2006); Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2027.  The survivor child’s 
insurance benefits provision of the Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 402(d). 
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vivor benefits.5  The Court reasoned that such an interpretation was 
consistent with the statute’s textual meaning and purpose, passed in-
spection under the rational basis test, and was entitled to judicial def-
erence.6 
In so holding, the Court failed to protect the rights of a unique 
class of citizens.  The Court improperly distinguished posthumously 
conceived children from other illegitimate children who are protect-
ed under the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment.7  Instead, the Court should have remanded 
the case to allow the parties to present evidence on the question of 
whether posthumously conceived children represent a different sub-
category of illegitimate children not entitled to intermediate scruti-
ny.8  By failing to do so, the Supreme Court improperly applied ra-
tional basis review and found that the SSA’s interests for deferring to 
state intestacy law were legitimate.9  As a result, the Court upheld a 
policy by the SSA that applied state intestacy laws without limitation to 
a previously protected class, thereby failing to protect this vulnerable 
segment of society.10  The Court should have followed its own prece-
dent and applied intermediate scrutiny to this discriminatory policy so 
that posthumously conceived children receive equal protection under 
the law.11 
I.  THE CASE 
In August 1999, shortly after Robert and Karen Capato married, 
Mr. Capato was diagnosed with cancer.12  Mr. Capato deposited his 
semen in a sperm bank because the couple wanted to have children 
                                                        
 5.  42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2), (h)(3)(C); Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2026.  
 6.  Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2026, 2033. 
 7.  See infra Part IV.A.  For a detailed explanation of why posthumously conceived 
children are properly classified as “illegitimate,” see infra notes 161−168, 173−178 and ac-
companying text. 
 8.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 9.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 10.  See infra Part IV.D. 
 11.  See infra Part IV.D. 
 12.  Capato ex rel. B.N.C., K.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 627 (3d Cir. 
2011), rev’d sub nom. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012). 
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but feared that cancer treatments could cause sterility.13  Notwith-
standing Mr. Capato’s cancer treatments, Mrs. Capato conceived nat-
urally, giving birth to a son in August 2001.14  The Capatos desired a 
sibling for their son, but Mr. Capato died in March 2002.15 
At the time of his death, Mr. Capato was a Florida resident and 
had executed a will in Florida.16  Mr. Capato’s will named his son, who 
was born to Karen Capato in August 2001, and two other children 
from a previous marriage as beneficiaries.17  The will did not contain a 
provision for posthumously conceived children.18 
Shortly after Mr. Capato died, Mrs. Capato underwent in vitro 
fertilization (“IVF”) treatments using Mr. Capato’s frozen sperm.19  In 
January 2003, Mrs. Capato became pregnant and, in September 2003, 
eighteen months after Mr. Capato’s death, Mrs. Capato gave birth to 
twins.20 
One month later, Mrs. Capato applied for survivor insurance 
benefits from the SSA on behalf of the twins, but the SSA denied her 
claims.21  On reconsideration, the SSA again denied Mrs. Capato’s 
claims.22  An administrative law judge, hearing the evidence de novo, 
                                                        
 13.  Capato ex rel. B.N.C., K.N.C. v. Astrue, Civ. No. 08-5405 (DMC), 2010 WL 1076522, 
at *1–2 (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2010), aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 
K.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 14.  Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2026 (2012). 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id.; Capato ex rel. B.N.C., K.N.C., 631 F.3d at 627.  
 17.  Capato ex rel. B.N.C., K.N.C., 631 F.3d at 627–28. 
 18.  Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2026.  Specifically, Mr. Capato’s will distributed his tangible 
personal property to Mrs. Capato, “and then to any of his children who survive him.”  Ca-
pato ex rel. B.N.C., K.N.C., 2010 WL 1076522, at *2. 
 19.  Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2026.  There is a discrepancy as to whether Mrs. Capato con-
ceived through artificial insemination or through in vitro fertilization.  Compare Capato ex 
rel. B.N.C., K.N.C., 2010 WL 1076522, at *3 (stating that “[Mrs. Capato] underwent artifi-
cial insemination treatments in Florida”), with Capato ex rel. B.N.C., K.N.C., 631 F.3d at 628 
(stating that “Ms. Capato began in vitro fertilization using the frozen sperm of her hus-
band”). 
 20.  Capato ex rel. B.N.C., K.N.C., 2010 WL 1076522, at *3.  The twins were Mr. Capato’s 
biological children.  Capato ex rel. B.N.C., K.N.C., 631 F.3d at 630.  
 21.  Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2026; Capato ex rel. B.N.C., K.N.C., 631 F.3d at 628. 
 22.  Capato ex rel. B.N.C., K.N.C., 2010 WL 1076522, at *1. 
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also denied the claims.23  A year later in 2008, the SSA’s Appeals 
Council denied Mrs. Capato’s request for review.24 
After exhausting the administrative appeals process, Mrs. Capato 
filed a lawsuit against the Commissioner of Social Security, Michael J. 
Astrue, in the United States District Court for the District of New Jer-
sey.25  The district court affirmed the SSA’s final decision finding that 
the Capato twins were not “children” within the meaning of the Act.26  
The district court reasoned that under 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A),27 a 
decedent’s posthumously conceived child qualifies for survivor insur-
ance benefits only if the child can inherit as an heir under state intes-
tacy law.28  The district court concluded that the Capato twins did not 
qualify as children under Florida’s inheritance laws because they were 
conceived after Mr. Capato’s death.29  Thus, the Capato twins were 
deemed ineligible for Social Security survivor benefits.30 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit af-
firmed in part and vacated in part.31  The Third Circuit noted that 
                                                        
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. at *4–5. 
 27.  The provision for determining whether an applicant for survivor benefits is a child 
of the insured reads as follows: 
In determining whether an applicant is the child . . . of a fully or currently in-
sured individual for purposes of this subchapter, the Commissioner of Social Se-
curity shall apply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of 
intestate personal property by the courts of the State in which such insured indi-
vidual is domiciled at the time such applicant files application, or, if such insured 
individual is dead, by the courts of the State in which he was domiciled at the 
time of his death, or, if such insured individual is or was not so domiciled in any 
State, by the courts of the District of Columbia.  Applicants who according to 
such law would have the same status relative to taking intestate personal property 
as a child . . . shall be deemed such. 
42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (2006).  To maintain consistency with the Supreme Court and 
lower court opinions in Capato, this Note uses “§ 402” and “§ 416” to refer to subsections of 
Title 42 of the United States Code, not to subsections of the individual Social Security Act. 
 28.  Capato ex rel. B.N.C., K.N.C., 2010 WL 1076522, at *5. 
 29.  Id. at *6–7. 
 30.  Id. at *5, *7. 
 31.  Capato ex rel. B.N.C., K.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 628 & n.1, 632 
(3d Cir. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012). 
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§ 416(h) was relevant only “where a claimant’s status as a deceased 
wage-earner’s child is in doubt.”32  The court reasoned that the plain 
language of § 416(e)33 is clear as to the definition of “child,” and that 
neither § 416(h) nor state intestacy law needs to be considered in sit-
uations involving the “undisputed biological children of a deceased 
wage earner and his widow.”34  Accordingly, the Third Circuit con-
cluded that the Capato twins were children within the meaning of the 
Act’s survivor insurance benefits provision and required an evaluation 
of dependency to determine whether the twins were entitled to Social 
Security survivor insurance benefits.35 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict 
among the federal circuit courts of appeal regarding the status of 
posthumously conceived children under the Act’s survivor insurance 
benefits provision.36 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Since the Social Security Amendments of 1939, Congress has 
recognized the need to provide survivor insurance benefits to certain 
family members, including children.37  Legitimacy of birth has played 
a significant part in determinations of which children receive these 
benefits.38  The nation’s highest court has, for nearly half a century, 
recognized the need to protect illegitimate children, one of the most 
vulnerable populations, from the often harsh and unforgiving policies 
of state and local governments.39  More recently, lower courts have 
differed on how to handle situations involving entitlement to benefits 
and the development of fertility technology, namely a new subcatego-
                                                        
 32.  Id. at 631. 
 33.  See 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) (2006) (defining the term “child” under the Act). 
 34.  Capato ex rel. B.N.C., K.N.C., 631 F.3d at 631–32. 
 35.  Id. at 632.  Applying reasoning from Ninth Circuit’s decision in Vernoff v. Astrue, 
568 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2009), the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismis-
sal of the Capatos’ equal protection claim.  Id. at 628 n.1 (“Such a classification does not 
violate Equal Protection laws because it is reasonably related to the government’s interest 
in assuring that survivor benefits reach children who depended on the support of a wage-
earner and lost that support due to the wage-earner’s death.”). 
 36.  Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2027 (2012). 
 37.  See infra Part II.A. 
 38.  See infra Part II.A. 
 39.  See infra Part II.B. 
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ry of illegitimate children who are conceived using IVF after the death 
of one parent.40 
A.  The Social Security Act 
During the Great Depression, President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
signed the Social Security Act into law.41  Initially, the Act created a 
“social insurance program” designed to provide retired workers with 
an income after retirement.42  Congress amended the Act in 1939, 
adding survivor insurance benefits for certain family members of cov-
ered workers who had died.43  Beneficiaries under this provision in-
cluded widows, children, and the insured’s parents.44  The purpose of 
the Act and the dependent benefits provision was to provide support 
for the dependants of a disabled or deceased worker and to relieve 
some of the burdens of life.45  Courts have since interpreted the Act as 
a remedial statute intended to serve humanitarian aims.46 
Today, to be eligible for survivor insurance benefits under the 
Act, a child applicant of a deceased insured worker must prove that 
                                                        
 40.  See infra Part II.C. 
 41.  Pub. L. No. 74-271, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 301–1397mm (2006)); Historical Background and Development of Social Security, SOC. 
SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html (last visited Mar. 4, 
2013). 
 42.  Historical Background and Development of Social Security, supra note 41; see also § 702, 
49 Stat. at 636 (“The [Social Security] Board . . . shall also have the duty of studying and 
making recommendations as to the most effective methods of providing economic security 
through social insurance . . . .”). 
 43.  Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-379, § 202, 53 Stat. 1360, 
1363–67 (1939) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 402 (2006)).  
 44.  § 202(b)–(e), 53 Stat. at 1362–66.   
 45.  Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 633–34 (1974); Graham v. Barnhart, 278 F. 
Supp. 2d 1251, 1262–63 (D. Kan. 2003). 
 46.  See, e.g., Capato ex rel. B.N.C., K.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 629 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (acknowledging the need for a liberal application of the Act in light of “‘its re-
medial and humanitarian aims’” (citation omitted), rev’d sub nom. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. 
B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012); Dorsey v. Bowen, 828 F.2d 246, 248 (4th Cir. 1987) (“The 
Social Security Act is a remedial statute, to be broadly construed and liberally applied in 
favor of beneficiaries.”); see also Acierno v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 2007) (same); 
Cohen v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 964 F.2d 524, 531 (6th Cir. 1992) 
(same); Marcus v. Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 29 (2d Cir. 1979) (same); Eisenhauer v. Mathews, 
535 F.2d 681, 686 (2d Cir. 1976) (same). 
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he: (1) meets the Act’s definition of a “child” and (2) is dependent on 
the insured parent.47  Whether an applicant qualifies as a child under 
the Act depends on the applicant’s relationship to the insured.  In § 
416(e), the Act broadly defines a child as “the child or legally adopted 
child of an individual.”48  The Act asserts in § 416(h)(2)(A), however, 
that state intestacy law determines if an applicant is a child under the 
Act.49  The SSA has required applicants to satisfy both § 416(e) and 
§ 416(h) to secure the status of a child under the Act.50  Regarding 
the dependency requirement, children who are considered legitimate 
are presumed dependent.51  When a child is not considered legiti-
mate, however, the child must attempt to prove dependency because 
there is no parallel presumption of dependency for illegitimate chil-
dren.52 
                                                        
 47.  42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) (2006); 20 C.F.R. § 404.350 (2012). 
 48.  42 U.S.C. § 416(e)(1) (2006). 
 49.  Id. § 416(h)(2)(A).  The Act also provides additional ways for an applicant to qual-
ify as a child eligible to receive survivorship benefits, which include the following: (1) if the 
insured and the other parent “went through a marriage ceremony resulting in a purported 
marriage between them which, but for a legal impediment . . . would have been a valid 
marriage”; (2) if a deceased insured individual, before death, “(I) had acknowledged in writ-
ing that the applicant [wa]s his or her son or daughter, (II) had been decreed . . . to be 
the mother or father of the applicant, or (III) had been ordered . . . to contribute to the 
support of the applicant”; or (3) if the deceased insured individual “is shown . . . to have 
been the mother or father of the applicant, and such insured individual was living with or 
contributing to the support of the applicant at the time such insured individual died.”  42 
U.S.C. § 416 (h)(2)(B), (h)(3)(C)(i)–(ii) (2006).  The SSA noted in an acquiescence rul-
ing that “[t]hese additional tests for eligibility require action by the insured during the 
lifetime of the child.”  SSAR 05-1(9), 70 Fed. Reg. 55,656, 55,657 n.3 (Sept. 22, 2005). 
 50.  See, e.g., Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 52−53 (4th Cir. 2011) (“On the SSA’s view, 
§ 416(h) ‘provides the analytical framework that [it] must follow for determining whether 
a child is the insured’s child’ for purposes of § 416(e)(1)’s definition.” (alteration in orig-
inal)), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2680 (2012). 
 51.  See, e.g., Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 635 (1974) (noting that legitimate 
children are “by statute ‘deemed dependent’”).   
 52.  Id. at 635.  For example, a natural child whose mother or father did not marry the 
insured individual may be entitled to benefits if “the insured was either living with [the 
applicant] or contributing to [his] support at the time [he] applied for benefits” or, in the 
case of an “insured [who] is not alive at the time of [the applicant’s] application, [if the 
applicant] ha[s] evidence to show that the insured was either living with [him] or contrib-
uting to [his] support when he or she died.”  20 C.F.R. § 404.355 (2012). 
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In the case of a posthumously conceived child, an applicant’s eli-
gibility to inherit under state intestacy law is dispositive to determin-
ing whether the posthumously conceived child is eligible for Social 
Security survivor insurance benefits.53  If a posthumously conceived 
child is considered legitimate under state intestacy law, then the child 
qualifies as a child under the Act, is presumed dependent, and is eli-
gible for survivor insurance benefits.54  If, however, the posthumously 
conceived child is illegitimate under state intestacy law, the child is 
not even considered a “child” under the Act and, thus, cannot receive 
the benefits.55  In effect, the SSA incorporates a state’s definition of a 
child when determining the inheritance rights of a posthumously 
conceived child seeking survivor insurance benefits. 
B.  Establishing Intermediate Scrutiny for Classifications Based on 
Illegitimacy 
Since the early 1970s, the Supreme Court’s equal protection ju-
risprudence has steadily progressed toward establishing intermediate 
scrutiny for classifications based on illegitimacy.  In Weber v. Aetna 
Casualty and Surety Co.,56 the Supreme Court struck down a Louisiana 
state law that set different standards for legitimate and illegitimate 
children to obtain worker’s compensation benefits after the death of a 
parent.57  The Court stated that the law relegated dependent but 
“unacknowledged illegitimates” to a lower status than that afforded to 
legitimate children.58  Applying a form of intermediate scrutiny,59 the 
                                                        
 53.  See, e.g., Schafer, 641 F.3d at 53 (noting that “[t]o meet the definition of ‘child’ un-
der the Act, an after-conceived child must be able to inherit under State law” (citation 
omitted)). 
 54.  42 U.S.C. §§ 402 (d)(1),(3), 416(e), (h) (2006). 
 55.  Cf. SSAR 05-1(9), 70 Fed. Reg. 55,656, 55,657 (Sept. 22, 2005) (“A child who can-
not inherit personal property from the deceased insured individual under State intestacy 
law may nonetheless be eligible for child’s insurance benefits under limited circumstances 
under sections 216(h)(2)(B) and (3)(C); these circumstances do not apply to an after-
conceived child.  Consequently, to meet the definition of ‘‘child’’ under the Act, an after-
conceived child must be able to inherit under State law.”). 
 56.  406 U.S. 164 (1972). 
 57.  Id. at 165, 167−69. 
 58.  Id. at 169−70. 
 59.  Intermediate scrutiny assesses whether a law serves an “important governmental 
objective” and whether the law is substantially related to achieving that goal.  Clark v. Jeter, 
486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
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Court concluded that this lower status bore “no significant relation-
ship” to the State’s interests of promoting family relationships and 
minimizing problems of proof of parentage.60  The Supreme Court 
reasoned that condemning a child for the actions of the parents was 
“illogical and unjust.”61 
Two years later, the Supreme Court affirmed Weber’s use of in-
termediate scrutiny for legitimacy-based classifications.  In Jimenez v. 
Weinberger,62 the Court addressed an equal protection challenge based 
on the Act’s different dependency standards for legitimate and illegit-
imate children.63  Jimenez dealt with the denial of disability benefits to 
two illegitimate children who were born out of wedlock after the on-
set of their parent’s disability.  The Jimenez Court, applying a form of 
intermediate scrutiny, determined that the nonlegitimated illegiti-
mate children were deprived of equal protection because both classi-
fications of illegitimate children, legitimated and nonlegitimated, 
were similarly situated and posed the same potential to generate spu-
rious claims.64  The Court explained that the subclassifications within 
the Act’s illegitimate children classification, which included those 
children who were presumed dependent due to state intestacy law 
and those who were not, were both overinclusive and underinclusive 
and, thus, were unconstitutional because they barred recovery for il-
legitimate children born after the onset of the parental disability.65 
Shortly thereafter, in Mathews v. Lucas,66 the Supreme Court 
again addressed the constitutionality of the Act’s dependency provi-
sions under the equal protection component of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.67  The Court acknowledged that the 
dependency presumptions in the Act resulted in the different treat-
ment of similarly situated classes of children—legitimate and illegiti-
                                                        
 60.  Weber, 406 U.S. at 172–73, 175−76. 
 61.  Id. at 175–76. 
 62.  417 U.S. 628 (1974). 
 63.  Id. at 631, 634–37. 
 64.  Id. at 632, 635−37. 
 65.  See id. at 637 (“[T]he two subclasses of illegitimates stand on equal footing, and 
the potential for spurious claims is the same as to both; hence to conclusively deny one 
subclass benefits presumptively available to the other denies the former the equal protec-
tion of the laws guaranteed by the due process provision of the Fifth Amendment.”). 
 66.  427 U.S. 495 (1976). 
 67.  U.S. CONST. amend. V; Mathews, 427 U.S. at 497, 502. 
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mate.68  The Mathews Court was not clear as to the level of scrutiny it 
applied, but the Court still found that the classifications, which ex-
cluded a subclass of illegitimate children, were reasonably related to 
the government interest of administrative convenience and the likeli-
hood of dependency.69 
In the cases that followed, the Supreme Court regularly applied 
intermediate scrutiny to determine inheritance rights for illegitimate 
children.  For example, in Trimble v. Gordon,70 the Court addressed the 
constitutionality of an Illinois law that allowed an illegitimate child to 
inherit under state intestacy law only from his mother and not from 
his father.71  By contrast, Illinois intestacy law allowed a legitimate 
child to inherit from both his mother and his father.72  Following its 
precedent regarding illegitimacy-based classifications,73 the Supreme 
Court applied intermediate scrutiny and deemed the Illinois law un-
constitutional.74 
                                                        
 68.  Mathews, 427 U.S. at 507–09. 
 69.  See id. at 509–10 (“[W]e think that the statutory classifications challenged here are 
justified as reasonable empirical judgments that are consistent with a design to qualify en-
titlement to benefits upon a child’s dependency at the time of the parent’s death.”).  The 
Court rejected applying either strict scrutiny or toothless rational basis review.  Cf. id. 
(“Under the standard of review applicable here . . . the materiality of the relation between 
the statutory classifications and the likelihood of dependency they assertedly reflect need 
not be ‘scientifically substantiated.’ . . .  [T]he scrutiny . . .  is not a toothless one.” (cita-
tions omitted)).  In dissent, Justice Stevens highlighted the Court’s failure to explain the 
applicable level of scrutiny.  See id. at 519–20 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A]n admittedly 
illogical and unjust result should not be accepted without both a better explanation and 
also something more than a ‘possibly rational’ basis.”).  Justice Stevens also opined that the 
dependency presumptions violated equal protection because administrative convenience 
did not justify the overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness of the Act’s classifications re-
garding the presumption of dependency.  Id. at 517–23 (“[I]n the name of ‘administrative 
convenience’ the Court allows these survivors’ benefits to be allocated on grounds which 
have only the most tenuous connection to the supposedly controlling factor—the child’s 
dependency on his father.”). 
 70.  430 U.S. 762 (1977). 
 71.  Id. at 763–65. 
 72.  Id. at 763. 
 73.  See id. at 766 n.11 (listing a line of cases and noting that “[the instant] case repre-
sents the 12th time since 1968 that [the Court] ha[s] considered the constitutionality of 
alleged discrimination on the basis of illegitimacy”). 
 74.  See id. at 762, 769–71 (“Despite the conclusion that classifications based on illegit-
imacy fall in a ‘realm of less than strictest scrutiny,’ . . . the scrutiny ‘is not a toothless 
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Likewise, in Clark v. Jeter,75 the Supreme Court considered the 
constitutionality of a Pennsylvania law that contained two different 
sets of requirements for a child to receive support from his father 
based on the child’s legitimacy status.76  For an illegitimate child to 
receive support, the Pennsylvania law required the child to (1) “prove 
paternity before seeking support from his or her father” and (2) file 
“a suit to establish paternity . . . within six years of [the] child’s 
birth.”77  A legitimate child, by contrast, could seek support from his 
father at any time, without the requirements placed on an illegitimate 
child.78  Applying intermediate scrutiny, the Court unanimously con-
cluded that the Pennsylvania law violated the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment because “the 6-year statute of limita-
tions [wa]s not substantially related to [the state’s] interest in avoid-
ing the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims.”79  Thus, by the late 
1980s, the Supreme Court had clearly established its reliance on in-
termediate scrutiny to evaluate illegitimacy-based classifications. 
C.  Posthumously Conceived Children and Their Rights to Social Security 
Survivor Insurance Benefits 
The line of cases from the 1970s to 1980s that addressed claims 
involving illegitimate children did not consider the issue of posthu-
mously conceived children.80  Today, thanks to advancements in med-
                                                        
one,’ . . . .” (citations omitted)).  In dissent, Justice Rehnquist noted that the majority of 
the Court’s equal protection cases involving illegitimacy-based classifications applied a 
heightened scrutiny that was more searching than that applied to other laws that regulated 
economic and social conditions.  See id. at 781–86 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (critiquing 
the majority’s standard of scrutiny application and writing that “[t]he appropriate ‘scruti-
ny,’ in the eyes of the Court, appears to involve some analysis of the relation of the ‘pur-
pose’ of the legislature to the ‘means’ by which it chooses to carry out that purpose.”).  Of 
the seven cases that Justice Rehnquist cited, he noted that only one outlier case, Mathews v. 
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976), failed to apply heightened scrutiny.  Id. 
 75.  486 U.S. 456 (1988). 
 76.  Id. at 457. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. at 457, 461, 463−65. 
 80.  See, e.g., id. at 457−58 (addressing claims of a child conceived and born during the 
lifetime of both parents); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 763−64 (1977) (same); 
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 497 (1976) (same); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 
630 (1974) (same); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 165 (1972) (addressing 
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ical technology and the use of IVF, posthumously conceived children 
are a reality.  As a result, cases that center on the ability of posthu-
mously conceived children to inherit from their deceased parent(s) 
have appeared in state courts.81  Within the last decade, cases address-
ing the eligibility of posthumously conceived children to receive So-
cial Security survivor insurance benefits have surfaced in federal 
court.82  During this brief time period, a circuit court split developed 
regarding the role of state intestacy law in defining a “child” under 
the Act. 
1.  Initial State Court Cases Regarding the Inheritance Rights of 
Posthumously Conceived Children 
In re Estate of Kolacy83 was the first notable case that addressed 
posthumously conceived children in the context of Social Security 
survivor benefits.  In November 1996, more than eighteen months af-
ter William J. Kolacy died, his wife gave birth to twins who were con-
ceived through IVF using sperm that Mr. Kolacy had deposited in a 
sperm bank.84  Mrs. Kolacy filed for Social Security survivor insurance 
benefits on behalf of the twins.85  The SSA denied the request, indicat-
ing that under New Jersey intestacy law, the twins were not considered 
children of the deceased.86  The Superior Court of New Jersey, how-
ever, granted declaratory relief, concluding that the posthumously 
                                                        
claims of one illegitimate child born during the parents’ lifetime and a second child con-
ceived during the parents’ lifetime, but born after the father’s death); see also In re Estate of 
Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1260 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000) (“I have not been able to find 
any American appellate court decisions dealing with th[e] central issue” of intestacy rights 
of posthumously conceived children). 
 81.  See, e.g., Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 259 (Mass. 2002); In re 
Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1258−60. 
 82.  See, e.g., Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 956 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
2679 (2012); Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 50−51 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
2680 (2012); Vernoff v. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009); Gillett-Netting v. 
Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 594−95 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated by Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 
132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012). 
 83.  753 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000). 
 84.  Id. at 1258. 
 85.  Id. at 1259. 
 86.  Id. 
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conceived twins were Mr. Kolacy’s legal heirs under New Jersey intes-
tacy law.87 
In 2002, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts addressed 
a similar issue in Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security.88 In 1995, 
two years after her husband died, Lauren Woodward gave birth to 
twin girls conceived through artificial insemination using her hus-
band’s preserved sperm.89  Similar to the wife in Kolacy, Mrs. Wood-
ward sought Social Security survivor insurance benefits on behalf of 
the twins, which the SSA denied.90  Answering a question certified to it 
by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts,91 
the Woodward court concluded that, under Massachusetts law, the 
twins did not have intestacy rights because there was no evidence that 
their father “affirmatively consented (1) to posthumous reproduction 
and (2) to support any resulting child.”92  To make this determina-
tion, however, the court established a balancing test that considered 
“three powerful State interests: the best interests of children, the 
State’s interest in the orderly administration of estates, and the re-
productive rights of the genetic parent.”93  Noting that “posthumously 
conceived children are always nonmarital children,”94 the court also 
proclaimed that all children are entitled to the same rights, including 
the right to support from their parents’ estates, “regardless of the ac-
                                                        
 87.  Id. at 1263–64.  The court indicated that once paternity is established, a child 
“should routinely [be] grant[ed] . . . the legal status of being an heir of the decedent, un-
less doing so would unfairly intrude on the rights of other persons or would cause serious 
problems in terms of the orderly administration of estates.”  Id. at 1262.  The court, how-
ever, did not reach the issue of entitlement to Social Security survivor insurance benefits.  
Id. at 1258 (noting that “it is appropriate for me to interpret New Jersey statutory law as it 
applies to [the Kolacy twins]” but that “[t]he ultimate question of whether [the twins] are 
entitled to Social Security benefits is something which is exclusively a matter for federal 
tribunals.”). 
 88.  760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002). 
 89.  Id. at 260. 
 90.  Id. at 260–61. 
 91.  Id. at 261 (“The United States District Court judge certified the above question to 
this court because ‘[t]he parties agree that a determination of these children’s rights un-
der the law of Massachusetts is dispositive of the case and . . . no directly applicable Massa-
chusetts precedent exists.’” (alterations in original)). 
 92.  Id. at 270–72. 
 93.  Id. at 264–66. 
 94.  Id. at 266–67. 
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cidents of their birth.”95  In arriving at its ultimate conclusion, howev-
er, the court acknowledged that “the best interests of the posthu-
mously conceived child, while of great importance, are not in them-
selves conclusive,” in part because “[a]ny inheritance rights of 
posthumously conceived children will reduce the intestate share 
available to children born prior to the decedent’s death.”96 
2.  Inconsistency Among Federal Circuits Regarding Posthumously 
Conceived Children’s Eligibility to Receive Survivor Insurance 
Benefits 
A pivotal moment regarding the rights of posthumously con-
ceived children and their eligibility for Social Security survivor insur-
ance benefits occurred when the Ninth Circuit decided Gillett-Netting 
v. Barnhart.97  In 1996, after Rhonda Gillett-Netting gave birth to twins 
who were posthumously conceived following her husband’s death, 
Mrs. Gillett-Netting filed for child survivor benefits on their behalf.98  
The SSA denied her claim.99  On judicial review of the SSA’s final de-
termination, the United States District Court for the District of Arizo-
na concluded that because the twins did not qualify as children under 
Arizona intestacy law and they could not prove dependency on the 
deceased insured, the SSA properly denied benefits.100  Addressing 
Mrs. Gillett-Netting’s equal protection claims, the district court ap-
plied rational basis review, reasoning that no suspect or quasi-suspect 
class was involved in the classification of distinguishing between bio-
logical children in existence at the time of the insured’s death and 
those not in existence at that time.101  The district court then rejected 
Mrs. Gillett-Netting’s equal protection claim, noting that the SSA ra-
tionally relied on state intestacy law and that because the posthumous-
                                                        
 95.  Id. at 265.  
 96.  Id. at 266. 
 97.  371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated by Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 
2021 (2012).   
 98.  Id. at 594–95. 
 99.  See id. (noting that the claim was denied by the SSA and an administrative law 
judge and that the Social Security Appeals Council denied a request for review). 
 100.  Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 231 F. Supp. 2d 961, 965–67, 970 (D. Ariz. 2002), rev’d, 
371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated by Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 
(2012). 
 101.  Id. at 970. 
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ly conceived twins could not prove dependency, they were not enti-
tled to Social Security survivor benefits.102 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, conclud-
ing that the twins were legitimate children under Arizona law103 and 
were therefore “deemed dependent under § 402(d)(3) and need not 
demonstrate actual dependency nor deemed dependency under the 
provisions of § 416(h).”104  The Ninth Circuit, however, never ad-
dressed the equal protection claim.105 
Following the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Gillett-Netting, the SSA is-
sued an acquiescence ruling that clarified how the Ninth Circuit’s 
reasoning in Gillett-Netting differed from the SSA’s interpretation of 
the Act.106  The SSA explained how it would apply Gillett-Netting in the 
Ninth Circuit when determining eligibility for survivor’s benefits of a 
child conceived by artificial means after an insured individual’s 
death.107  The SSA observed that “[a]ll of the States and jurisdictions 
within the Ninth Circuit, except Guam, have eliminated distinctions 
between legitimate and illegitimate children.”108  The SSA also point-
                                                        
 102.  See id. at 969–70 (“Because Juliet and Piers had not been conceived at the time of 
Robert’s death, they are not entitled to survivor’s benefits under the Act.  Additionally, 
their equal protection rights have not been violated.”). 
 103.  See Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 598 (explaining that Arizona eliminated legitimacy-
based distinctions to protect innocent children from the actions of their parents).  The 
Ninth Circuit recognized that “[i]n Arizona, ‘[e]very child is the legitimate child of its 
natural parents and is entitled to support and education as if born in lawful wedlock.’”  Id. 
(quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-601 (2011)). 
 104.  Id. at 599. 
 105.  See id. at 594 n.1 (“Because we conclude that [the twins] are entitled to benefits 
under the Act, we do not reach Gillett–Netting’s equal protection claim.”). 
 106.  See generally SSAR 05-1(9), 70 Fed. Reg. 55,656, 55,657 (Sept. 22, 2005). 
 107.  Id. at 55657; see also id. (“This ruling applies only to cases involving an applicant 
for surviving child’s benefits who applies on the earnings record of a person who, at the 
time of death, had his permanent home in [the Ninth Circuit,] Alaska, Arizona, Califor-
nia, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Northern Mariana Islands, Oregon, and 
Washington.”). 
 108.  Id.  The SSA stated that, within the Ninth Circuit, determinations of eligibility for 
survivor’s benefits for posthumously conceived children would differ from the determina-
tions used in other circuits:  
In a claim for survivor’s benefits, we will determine that a biological child of an 
insured individual who was conceived by artificial means after the insured’s 
death is the insured’s “child” for purposes of the Act.  We will not apply section 
216(h) of the Act in determining the child’s status.  In addition, if such child is 
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ed out that the only way a posthumously conceived child could qualify 
as a “child” under the Act was if the child could inherit under state in-
testacy law.109 
In addition to differences created by the Gillett-Netting decision 
and the SSA’s subsequent acquiescence ruling regarding the applica-
tion of the Act in the Ninth Circuit, a clear circuit court split devel-
oped in 2011 over whether posthumously conceived children were el-
igible for Social Security survivor insurance benefits.  On the one 
hand, the Third Circuit in Capato ex rel. B.N.C, K.N.C. v. Commissioner 
of Social Security110 agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s position regarding 
the SSA’s interpretation of the Act and determined that posthumous-
                                                        
considered legitimate under State law, we will consider the child to be the in-
sured’s “legitimate” child and thus deemed dependent upon the insured for 
purposes of section 202(d)(3) of the Act. . . . These States [in the Ninth Circuit] 
allow all children the same rights which flow between parents and their children, 
regardless of the parents’ marital status.  A child acquires these rights if he estab-
lishes that an individual is his parent under State family law provisions.  Accord-
ingly, if all other requirements are met, adjudicators will consider such child en-
titled to child’s benefits under section 202(d) [of the Act]. 
Id.   
 109.  See id. (explaining that “to meet the definition of ‘child’ under the Act, an after-
conceived child must be able to inherit under State law”).  Indeed, courts have understood 
the SSA’s interpretation of the Act to mean that a posthumously conceived child cannot 
satisfy the alternative mechanisms for qualifying as a child under the Act found in either 
42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(B) or § 416(h)(3)(C).  See, e.g., Capato ex rel. B.N.C., K.N.C. v. 
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 631 (3d Cir. 2011) (“An ‘after-conceived’ child, [the 
SSA] continued, cannot satisfy the alternative mechanisms in §§ 416(h)(2)(B) and 
416(h)(3)(C) . . . .  There was no explanation as to why the statute even suggests, much 
less compels, that result.”), rev’d sub nom. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 
(2012); see also supra note 49.  The SSA also explained that a posthumously conceived child 
that is considered legitimate under state law is deemed dependent upon the insured and 
need not prove anything else.  SSAR 05-1(9), 70 Fed. Reg. 55,656, 55,657 (Sept. 22, 2005).  
The SSA, however, noted that if state law considers a posthumously conceived child illegit-
imate, then the child must prove dependency by showing that the father was living with 
the child or contributing to the child’s support prior to his death, which a posthumously 
conceived child cannot show.  Cf. id. (“Other children, though, must establish that they 
were living with their father at the time of his death or that he was contributing to their 
support in order to be found dependent . . . .”). 
 110.  631 F.3d 626 (3d Cir. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 
2021 (2012).  For an explanation of Capato ex rel. B.N.C, K.N.C., see supra text accompany-
ing notes 31–35. 
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ly conceived children were children under the Act.111  On the other 
hand, the Fourth Circuit in Schafer v. Astrue112 and the Eighth Circuit 
in Beeler v. Astrue113 concluded that posthumously conceived children 
were not children under the Act and, thus, were not eligible to re-
ceive survivorship benefits.114 
In Schafer v. Astrue, the Fourth Circuit ruled that posthumously 
conceived children were not eligible to collect Social Security survi-
vorship benefits because, under Virginia law, the children did not 
qualify as intestate heirs.115  The Fourth Circuit’s decision, therefore, 
upheld the SSA’s interpretation of the Act.116  The court, noting that 
“Congress understood § 416(h)(2)(A)’s intestacy provisions to be the 
backbone of all child status determinations,” reasoned that 42 U.S.C. 
§ 416(h) was the gateway through which all children had to pass to 
receive survivorship benefits.117  The court further explained, howev-
er, that in the 1965 Amendments to the Act,118 Congress had recog-
nized the need to provide a means for illegitimate children to estab-
lish child status and “add[ed] § 416(h)(3)(C) so that child status 
could also exist where parentage was acknowledged, decreed, implicit 
in a contribution order, or proven along with cohabitation or contri-
                                                        
 111.  See Capato ex rel. B.N.C., K.N.C., 631 F.3d at 630–32 (“To accept the argument of 
the [SSA], one would have to ignore the plain language of § 416(e) and find that the bio-
logical child of a married couple is not a ‘child’ within the meaning of § 402(d) unless that 
child can inherit under the intestacy laws of the domicile of the decedent.  There is no 
reason apparent to us why that should be so, and we join the Ninth Circuit in so conclud-
ing.”). 
 112.  641 F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2680 (2012). 
 113.  651 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2679 (2012). 
 114.  Id. at 956, 966; Schafer, 641 F.3d at 50–51, 63.  The facts for these cases are similar 
in that each dealt with a wife who conceived children through the use of assisted repro-
duction with her deceased husband’s frozen sperm.  Beeler, 651 F.3d at 956–57; Schafer, 641 
F.3d at 51.  In each case it was undisputed that the deceased husband was the biological 
father of the child.  Beeler, 651 F.3d at 957; Schafer, 641 F.3d at 51. 
 115.  See Schafer, 641 F.3d at 50–51, 63 (“Virginia intestacy law, as incorporated by the 
Act, does render survivorship benefits unavailable here.”).  The posthumously conceived 
child in Schafer was born almost seven years after his father died.  Id. at 51.  Virginia law, 
however, states that “a child born more than ten months after the death of a parent” can-
not inherit intestate.  VA. CODE ANN. § 20-164 (2008). 
 116.  Schafer, 641 F.3d at 50–51, 63. 
 117.  Id. at 57.  
 118.  Social Security Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified 
as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 6053 and in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
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bution.”119  Months later, in Beeler v. Astrue, the Eighth Circuit relied 
on the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Schafer and concluded that the 
SSA’s interpretation of the Act was reasonable, thereby solidifying a 
circuit split.120 
Although some cases that involve the issue of posthumously con-
ceived children and Social Security survivorship benefits have found 
that such children are legitimate under state intestacy law and have 
awarded survivor benefits, few cases have addressed the equal protec-
tion argument.121  In Vernoff v. Astrue,122 however, the Ninth Circuit 
addressed the equal protection argument that the SSA’s interpreta-
tion and application of its survivorship provision violated equal pro-
tection because the SSA excluded some posthumously conceived 
children from receiving survivor insurance benefits.123  The Ninth Cir-
cuit opined that the SSA’s interpretation only excluded posthumously 
conceived children who did not meet the requirements under state 
intestacy law and therefore, because the interpretation did not ex-
clude all posthumously conceived children, Mathews was control-
ling.124  Following Mathews, the Ninth Circuit applied rational basis re-
                                                        
 119.  Id. at 57–58. 
 120.  See 651 F.3d 954, 956, 962–63 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting the conflict in the circuits 
regarding the eligibility of posthumously conceived children to receive Social Security sur-
vivorship benefits). 
 121.  Cf. Julie E. Goodwin, Not All Children Are Created Equal: A Proposal to Address Equal 
Protection Inheritance Rights of Posthumously Conceived Children, 4 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 234, 
235 (2005) (“[T]he few courts and legislatures that have dealt with this issue [whether 
posthumously conceived children can inherit from a parent who has died prior to the 
child’s conception] have ignored the Equal Protection rights of these posthumously con-
ceived children.”). 
 122.  568 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 123.  Id. at 1112. 
 124.  See id. (“Because the SSA’s interpretation does not exclude all posthumously-
conceived children, we follow the Court’s example in Lucas and apply only rational basis 
review”).  The Ninth Circuit explained: 
In Lucas, the deemed dependency provisions of § 402(d)(3) were challenged be-
cause the SSA’s application of those provisions resulted in the extension of bene-
fits only to certain classes of illegitimate children. The Court did not apply 
heightened scrutiny, but instead upheld the provisions under rational basis re-
view.  Rational basis review was appropriate because the provisions did not draw 
a line between legitimate and illegitimate children, but rather included some il-
legitimate children while excluding others.  The Court accepted the SSA’s un-
contested view of the purpose of the Act, which “was not a general welfare provi-
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view and determined that the SSA’s interpretation of the Act was con-
stitutional because the classifications were reasonably related to limit-
ing benefits and administrative convenience.125 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Astrue v. Capato, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the 
judgment of the Third Circuit.126  The Court concluded that the SSA’s 
interpretation of the Act’s survivor insurance benefits provision, 
which allowed state intestacy law to determine whether a posthumous-
ly conceived child was a child under the Act and eligible to receive 
survivor benefits, was consistent with the statute’s textual meaning 
and purpose and was entitled to judicial deference.127  Accordingly, 
the Court agreed with the SSA that the Capato twins were not chil-
dren under the Act and, thus, were not eligible to receive Social Secu-
rity survivor insurance benefits.128 
Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg rejected the Third Cir-
cuit’s conclusion that 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) governs only when a child’s 
family status is undetermined.129  Instead, the Court was persuaded by 
the SSA’s interpretation of § 416(h) as “a gateway through which all 
applicants for insurance benefits as a ‘child’ must pass.”130  The Court 
                                                        
sion for legitimate or otherwise ‘approved’ children of deceased insureds, but 
was intended just ‘to replace the support lost by a child when his father . . . 
dies . . . .’”  The Court concluded that “the statutory classifications are permissi-
ble . . . because they are reasonably related to the likelihood of dependency at 
death.”  Moreover, the dependency presumptions were not impermissibly over-
inclusive, because they served the reasonable goal of “administrative conven-
ience.”  
Id. (internal citations omitted).  For a discussion of Mathews, see supra text accompanying 
notes 66−69. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  132 S. Ct. 2021, 2025, 2034 (2012). 
 127.  See id. at 2026, 2033 (“We conclude that the SSA’s reading is better attuned to the 
statute’s text and its design [and] is at least a permissible construction that garners the 
Court’s respect . . . .”). 
 128.  Id. at 2029, 2033. 
 129.  Id. at 2029. 
 130.  Id. (“The regulations make clear that the SSA interprets the Act to mean that the 
provisions of § 416(h) are the exclusive means by which an applicant can establish ‘child’ 
status under § 416(e) as a natural child.” (quoting Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 960 (8th 
Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2679 (2012))). 
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also rejected the Third Circuit’s conclusion that § 416(e) was disposi-
tive of the benefits eligibility question, and subsequently rejected  the 
conclusion that the Capato twins were eligible for the survivor insur-
ance benefits simply because they fit the definition of child under 
§ 416(e).131  The Supreme Court reasoned that “[n]othing in § 
416(e)’s tautological definition (‘child’ means . . . the child . . . of an 
individual) suggests that Congress understood the word ‘child’ to re-
fer only to the children of married parents.”132  For support, Justice 
Ginsburg offered dictionary definitions of the term “child,” references 
to “child” elsewhere in the Act that “expressly limited the category of 
children covered to offspring of a marital union,” and other statutes 
that “differentiate child of a marriage (‘legitimate child’) from the 
unmodified term ‘child.’”133 
The Court then pointed out that § 416(e) does not “indicate that 
Congress intended ‘biological parentage’ to be [a] prerequisite to 
‘child’ status.”134  Justice Ginsburg noted that when the Act was passed 
in 1939, a biological relationship could not be scientifically proven.135  
Further, she reasoned that “a biological parent is not necessarily a 
child’s parent under law” and that marriage does not indicate with 
certainty a child’s parentage.136  Moreover, the Court contended that 
even if Mrs. Capato’s proposed definition of “child”—the “biological 
child of married parents”137—was correct, it was unclear whether the 
posthumously conceived Capato twins would qualify under this defini-
tion because, under Florida law, a marriage ends when one spouse 
dies, and the Capato twins were conceived after the death of Mr. Ca-
pato.138 
Next, the Supreme Court explained why the SSA’s interpretation 
of the Act’s provision was more persuasive than that of Mrs. Capato.  
Addressing Mrs. Capato’s assertion that the use of state intestacy law 
was not mentioned in § 416(e) and, therefore, should not apply, Jus-
tice Ginsburg reasoned that the text of § 416(h) “explicitly comple-
                                                        
 131.  Id. at 2029. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. at 2029–30. 
 134.  Id. at 2030. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. (citing Brief for Respondent at 9, Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 
(2012) (No. 11-159)). 
 138.  Id.  (“If that [Florida] law applies, . . . the Capato twins . . . would not qualify as 
‘marital’ children.”).   
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mented” § 416(e), making it unnecessary to place redundant lan-
guage in § 416(e) as to how a child’s status is determined.139 Thus, the 
Court agreed with the SSA that “[r]eliance on state intestacy law to 
determine who is a ‘child’ . . . serves the Act’s driving objective.”140 
The Court emphasized that Congress’s “reference to state law to 
determine an applicant’s status as a ‘child’” is not an uncommon ap-
proach to defining family status.141  To illustrate that point, Justice 
Ginsburg pointed out that state law is referenced in other provisions 
in the Act.142  The Court also stated that Congress did not perceive 
“the core purpose” of the Act to be the creation of a program to ben-
efit the needy, but rather “to ‘provide . . . dependent members of [a 
wage earner’s] family with protection against the hardship occasioned 
by [the] loss of [the insured’s] earnings.’”143  The Court opined that 
the SSA’s reliance on state intestacy law to determine whether an ap-
plicant is a child under the Act better serves this purpose.144  Though 
acknowledging that some children who fall “outside the Act’s central 
concern” benefit from this interpretation, the Court nevertheless de-
termined that Congress’s regime of using state intestacy law to deter-
mine which children were dependent on the insured’s earnings was a 
workable solution within Congress’s authority.145 
The Court next rejected Mrs. Capato’s argument that “[t]he 
SSA’s construction of the Act raises serious constitutional concerns 
under the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause.”146  
The Court observed that this argument had been rejected by several 
courts, including the Ninth Circuit in Vernoff.147  Justice Ginsburg ex-
                                                        
 139.  Id. at 2029, 2031. 
 140.  Id. at 2032. 
 141.  Id. at 2031. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. at 2032 (alterations in original) (quoting Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 52 
(1977)). 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  See id. (“[T]he intestacy criterion yields benefits to some children outside the Act’s 
central concern. . . .  It was nonetheless Congress’ prerogative to legislate for the generali-
ty of cases.  It did so here by employing eligibility to inherit under state intestacy law as a 
workable substitute for burdensome case-by-case determinations whether the child was, in 
fact, dependent on her father’s earnings.”). 
 146.  Id. at 2033. 
 147.  See id. (citing Vernoff v. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting the 
Ninth Circuit’s approval of Congress’s regime as being reasonably related to the govern-
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plained that even though there are additional eligibility requirements 
for natural children under § 416(h), compared to, for example, 
adopted children or stepchildren, that does not necessarily indicate 
an advantage for non-biological children.148  Justice Ginsburg then 
stated that the proper level of scrutiny was rational basis review and 
determined that Congress’s regime of using state intestacy law was a 
“workable substitute for burdensome case-by-case determinations.”149 
Finally, the Supreme Court noted that, despite the fact that the 
SSA’s construction of the Act may not be the only reasonable inter-
pretation, it is a rational construction that deserves deference under 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.150  While 
the Court acknowledged the tragic circumstances of the case, it never-
theless explained that it could not replace the law that Congress en-
                                                        
ment’s interests in benefiting children who lose support and reducing administrative bur-
dens).  For a discussion of Vernoff, see supra text accompanying notes 122−125. 
 148.  See id. at 2032–33 (“In short, the Act and regulations set different eligibility re-
quirements for adopted children, stepchildren, grandchildren, and stepgrandchildren, 
but it hardly follows that applicants in those categories are treated more advantageously 
than are children who must meet a § 416(h) criterion.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 149.  Id. at 2033 (“Under rational-basis review, the regime Congress adopted easily pass-
es inspection.” (internal footnote omitted)). 
 150.  Id. at 2026, 2033–34 (“The SSA’s interpretation of the relevant provisions, adhered 
to without deviation for many decades, is at least reasonable; the agency’s reading is there-
fore entitled to this Court’s deference under Chevron.” (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat-
ural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984))).  In Capato, the Supreme Court noted 
that “Chevron deference is appropriate ‘when it appears that Congress delegated authority 
to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency inter-
pretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.’”  Id. at 
2033–24 (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001)).  Under 
Chevron, however, even if Congress has not expressly delegated authority to fill in a gap in 
a provision, the authority generally conferred to an agency can allow the agency to inter-
pret the provisions of the statute it administers with the force of law.  See Chevron, 467 U.S. 
at 844−45 (“Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is 
implicit rather than explicit.  In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construc-
tion of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of 
an agency.”).  Provided that the agency interpretation is not “arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2006), a 
reviewing court is obligated to give “legislative regulations . . . controlling weight.”  Chev-
ron, 467 U.S. at 843–44.  This has led the Supreme Court to conclude that Chevron defer-
ence “has produced a spectrum of judicial responses, from great respect at one end . . . to 
near indifference at the other.”  Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 228 (citations omitted). 
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acted, which determines eligibility for child survivor benefits under 
the Act based on state intestacy law, with a judicial mandate that “the 
statute’s text scarcely supports.”151 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Astrue v. Capato, the Supreme Court upheld the SSA’s inter-
pretation of the survivor benefits provision of the Act, thereby allow-
ing state intestacy law to continue to determine whether a posthu-
mously conceived child qualifies as a child under the Act and can 
receive Social Security survivor insurance benefits.152  With little dis-
cussion regarding the equal protection claim, the Court incorrectly 
distinguished between two classes of illegitimate children153 and failed 
to remand the case for a determination of whether posthumously 
conceived illegitimate children are entitled to the heightened scrutiny 
usually applied to illegitimacy-based classifications.154  As a result, the 
Court erred in applying rational basis review to the SSA’s interpreta-
tion of the survivor benefits provision and unnecessarily delayed a rul-
ing that would have protected this unique group of illegitimate chil-
dren.155  The Supreme Court should have honored its equal 
protection precedent regarding illegitimate children and applied in-
termediate scrutiny to these discriminatory measures.156  Moreover, 
even under rational basis review, the Court should have found that 
the SSA’s asserted interests are insufficient to justify denying survivor 
insurance benefits to these children.157 
A.  The Court Erred in Finding a Distinction Between Posthumously 
Conceived Children and Other Illegitimate Children 
From a legal and factual perspective, a posthumously conceived 
child is an illegitimate child.  In Capato, the Court upheld the SSA’s 
determination that the posthumously conceived Capato children were 
not children under the Act because, under state law, they were not 
entitled to an inheritance through intestate succession, thus implying 
that the twins were illegitimate children at the time of their actual 
                                                        
 151.  Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2034. 
 152.  See supra Part III. 
 153.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 154.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 155.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 156.  See infra Part IV.D. 
 157.  See infra Part IV.D.2. 
 1062 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1039 
birth.158  Nonetheless, in addressing Mrs. Capato’s equal protection 
claim, the Court was inconsistent in its reasoning that posthumously 
conceived children are distinguishable from other illegitimate chil-
dren.159  This distinction stemmed from an erroneous determination 
that, unlike the stigma suffered by traditional illegitimate children, 
there was no indication that posthumously conceived children suf-
fered such a stigma.160 
1.  Posthumously Conceived Children Are Illegitimate Children by 
Definition 
Historically, the Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase “ille-
gitimate child” to mean any non-marital child.161  In Capato, the Court 
found a distinction between posthumously conceived children and 
other illegitimate children based on presumptions regarding different 
conduct by the parents.162  The only distinction that can truly be made 
between posthumously conceived children and other illegitimate 
children is that the natural parents in the first instance used assisted 
reproductive technology to enable their pregnancies.163  This method 
                                                        
 158.  Cf. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2026−27 (2012) (“Under [Flori-
da] law, . . . a child born posthumously may inherit through intestate succession only if 
conceived during the decedent’s lifetime.”). 
 159.  See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 160.  See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 161.  See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 457, 461–64 (1988) (addressing the rights of a 
minor child born out of wedlock as an illegitimate child); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 
406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (“The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages socie-
ty’s condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage.”); see also Paula 
A. Monopoli, Nonmarital Children and Post-Death Parentage: A Different Path for Inheritance 
Law?, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 857, 857 & n.4 (2008) (referring to children born out of 
wedlock and explaining that “[t]he law has evolved from using the term ‘bastard’ for such 
children to using the phrase ‘illegitimate,’ then to ‘out-of-wedlock,’ and most recently 
‘nonmarital.’”). 
 162.  See Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2033 (indicating such a distinction by stating that “[n]o 
showing has been made that posthumously conceived children share the characteristics 
that prompted our skepticism of classifications disadvantaging children of unwed par-
ents.”). 
 163.  See Gloria J. Banks, Traditional Concepts and Nontraditional Conceptions: Social Security 
Survivor’s Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 251, 263 (1999) 
(“Posthumously conceived children are a newly created class of nonmarital children [who] 
are conceived by nonconventional reproductive techniques . . . .”); Goodwin, supra note 
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of conception, however, makes posthumously conceived children no 
less illegitimate under the law.164 
A “legitimate child” is a child (1) “conceived or born in lawful 
wedlock” or (2) “legitimated by the parents’ later marriage or by a 
declaration or judgment of legitimation.”165  Posthumously conceived 
children do not satisfy the first part of the definition because in most 
states, a marriage ends upon the death of one of the spouses.166  In 
addition, a posthumously conceived child cannot be legitimated by a 
deceased parent.167  It then follows that posthumously conceived chil-
dren cannot be “legitimate.”  Many state intestacy laws, including the 
Florida laws relied on in Capato, recognize this, and therefore treat 
posthumously conceived children as illegitimate under the law.168 
                                                        
121, at 241, 254, 271 (noting that, historically, non-marital children were considered “chil-
dren of no one”; that current law generally states that if a child is not born within ten 
months of the death of the father, the child is considered illegitimate; and that “posthu-
mously conceived children are a class of non-marital children”); Christopher A. Scharman, 
Note, Not Without My Father: The Legal Status of the Posthumously Conceived Child, 55 VAND. L. 
REV. 1001, 1044 (2002) (“Nonmarital children and nonmarital posthumous children are 
similarly situated as they are both indisputably the genetic offspring of the parent, differ-
ing only in the timing and circumstances of their birth.”). 
 164.  Cf. Goodwin, supra note 121, at 271 (asserting that “posthumously conceived chil-
dren are a class of non-marital children”); Scharman, supra note 163, at 1039 (noting that 
“posthumous children are viewed as illegitimate”). 
 165.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 100 (3d pocket ed. 2006). 
 166.   See Banks, supra note 163, at 262 (stating that “[p]osthumously conceived children 
are de facto nonmarital children because their parents’ marital union dissolves at either 
spouse’s death.”); Ellen J. Garside, Comment, Posthumous Progeny: A Proposed Resolution to 
the Dilemma of the Posthumously Conceived Child, 41 LOY. L. REV. 713, 717 (1996) (“Marriage 
dissolves at death.”). 
 167.   See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 168.  Cf. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2030 (noting that a marriage ends when a spouse dies and 
concluding that “the Capato twins . . . would not qualify as ‘marital’ children”); Woodward 
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 266–67 (Mass. 2002) (“[P]osthumously conceived 
children are always nonmarital children. . . . [I]t follows that, under the intestacy statute, 
posthumously conceived children must obtain a judgment of paternity as a necessary pre-
requisite to enjoying inheritance rights in the estate of the deceased genetic father.”). 
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2.  Posthumously Conceived Children Do Share the Characteristics 
and Stigma of Illegitimate Children 
While recognizing that in both instances—being born out of 
wedlock and being posthumously conceived—the child is not at fault, 
the Capato Court reasoned that there was “[n]o showing . . . that 
posthumously conceived children share the characteristics that 
prompted [the Court’s] skepticism of classifications disadvantaging 
children of unwed parents.”169  The Court, however, failed to fully ex-
plain what these characteristics are.170  Previously, the Court’s ra-
tionale for applying intermediate scrutiny to illegitimacy-based classi-
fications was that it was unfair to punish children for the conduct of 
their parents.171  This rationale did not stem from a showing that the 
parents acted immorally; rather, it developed because society sought 
to punish what it considered or thought was immoral.172 
There is ample evidentiary support for believing that posthu-
mously conceived children are or will be subjected to the same stigma 
that other illegitimate children have traditionally faced and that, 
therefore, grouping posthumously conceived children with other ille-
gitimate children is justified.  First, society cannot distinguish between 
these illegitimate children because the difference is not noticeable to 
the public.173 In Mathews, the Court suggested that illegitimate chil-
dren have an immutable characteristic—the circumstances of their 
birth.174  Just like the “traditional” illegitimate children who were born 
                                                        
 169.  Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2033. 
 170.  The Court did acknowledge that it applies intermediate scrutiny when faced with 
challenges to laws that burden “‘illegitimate children for the sake of punishing the illicit 
relations of their parents.’”  Id. (citation omitted). 
 171.  See e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 
769–70 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 
U.S. 628, 631–32 (1974); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). 
 172.  See, e.g., Weber, 406 U.S. at 175 (“The status of illegitimacy has expressed through 
the ages society’s condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage. 
But visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust.”). 
 173.  See Mathews, 427 U.S. at 506 (observing that “illegitimacy does not carry an obvious 
badge”). 
 174.  See id. at 505 (“It is true, of course, that the legal status of illegitimacy, however de-
fined, is, like race or national origin, a characteristic determined by causes not within the 
control of the illegitimate individual . . . .”); see also Goodwin, supra note 121, at 245 n.76 
(“Illegitimacy is immutable because children born out of wedlock cannot control the sta-
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out of wedlock while both parents were alive, posthumously conceived 
children cannot control the circumstances of their birth.175  Second, 
to the average person, both sets of children may appear to consist of a 
child with one parent, subjecting them to social rejection and stig-
ma.176  Indeed, posthumously conceived children are the topic of 
moral debates regarding whether posthumous conception should 
even be allowed.177  Furthermore, similar to their earlier objections to 
traditional illegitimate children in the era when illegitimate children 
born to unwed mothers was less common, numerous religions now 
find posthumous conception immoral and oppose the practice.178 
As a result, just like society relegated traditional illegitimate chil-
dren to second-class status, posthumously conceived children are dis-
criminated against by society, state intestacy laws, government agen-
cies, and courts.179  Then in Capato, by failing to recognize that an 
                                                        
tus of their birth and cannot force their parents to legitimate them through subsequent 
marriage.”). 
 175.  Goodwin, supra note 121, at 272. 
 176.  See, e.g., id. at 272–73 (“[P]osthumously conceived children share the same familial 
circumstances as other non-marital children, by growing up outside the confines of a ‘tra-
ditional’ marital family.  Therefore, posthumously conceived children may experience the 
same social stigma as other non-marital children, especially if raised by single parents who 
do not remarry.”). 
 177.  See, e.g., Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 272 (Mass. 2002) (not-
ing the “complex moral, legal, social, and ethical questions that surround [posthumously 
conceived children’s] birth” will continue to increase); In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 
1257, 1263 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000) (stating that “[t]here are . . . ethical problems, 
social policy problems and legal problems which are presented when a child is brought 
into existence under circumstances where a traditionally normal parenting situation is not 
available. . . . The law should certainly be cautious about encouraging parents to move 
precipitously in this area.”); see also Bonnie Steinbock, Sperm As Property, 6 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 57, 62 (1995) (“There are also moral arguments against treating sperm as property. 
One such argument opposes posthumous reproduction, based on a desire to protect the 
resulting offspring.”). 
 178.  See, e.g., Cyrene Grothaus-Day, From Pipette to Cradle, from Immortality to Extinction, 7 
RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION ¶¶ 41, 44–51 (2005) (noting that “[t]he Catholic Church gener-
ally disapproves of [assisted reproductive technology] because it ‘separates the unitive 
from the procreative aspect of the marital act’” and that “[t]he Lutheran Church is ada-
mantly opposed to [posthumous conception]” (footnotes omitted)).  
 179.  See Susan N. Gary, We Are Family: The Definition of Parent and Child for Succession Pur-
poses, 34 ACTEC L.J. 171, 180–84 (2008) (discussing the different treatment for posthu-
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“illegitimate for one purpose but not for another” standard was being 
applied to posthumously conceived children, the Supreme Court un-
dermined the fundamental fairness emphasized by its prior hold-
ings.180 
B.  The Capato Court Failed to Remand the Case to Determine Whether 
Posthumously Conceived Children Have the Same Characteristics as 
Traditional Illegitimate Children 
Instead of discarding the equal protection argument, the Capato 
Court should have remanded the case for a determination of whether 
posthumously conceived children represent a different subcategory of 
illegitimate children who are not entitled to intermediate scrutiny.  
When a factual inquiry is essential to decide a constitutional question, 
a court should ensure that it has a complete factual record.181  A re-
mand is appropriate where there are important constitutional inter-
ests at stake, and the additional information is needed to resolve a 
complex question.182 
In Capato, the district court did not evaluate whether posthu-
mously conceived children should be considered illegitimate chil-
dren.183  The district court did not even use the term “illegitimate” in 
conducting its abbreviated equal protection analysis.  The Third Cir-
cuit did even less, dedicating only a footnote to its affirmance of the 
district court’s equal protection conclusion.184  The court failed to 
consider whether posthumously conceived children should be pro-
                                                        
mously conceived children in court cases and state statutes); see also supra notes 173–178 
and accompanying text. 
 180.  See supra text accompanying note 171. 
 181.  Columbia Union Coll. v. Clarke, 159 F.3d 151, 168 (4th Cir. 1998) (“Particularly 
when deciding difficult constitutional questions dependent on intensely factual determi-
nations, as in the case at hand, a court must assure itself that it has before it a full and 
complete factual record.”). 
 182.  Cf. id. (noting instances in which the Supreme Court remanded cases involving 
determinations of whether “an institution was ‘pervasively sectarian’” because of the lower 
courts’ “diligence in holding lengthy evidentiary hearings and making numerous factual 
findings”). 
 183.  See generally Capato ex rel. B.N.C., K.N.C. v. Astrue, Civ. No. 08-5405 (DMC), 2010 
WL 1076522 (D. N.J. Mar. 23, 2010), aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Capato ex rel. 
B.N.C., K.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 184.  Capato ex rel. B.N.C., K.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 628 n.1 (3d Cir. 
2011), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012). 
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tected as illegitimate children and made no inquiry or review of the 
issues later identified in the Supreme Court opinion.  The Supreme 
Court then, unsurprisingly, found no evidence available on the 
shared characteristics between posthumously conceived children and 
other illegitimate children, an issue into which neither of the lower 
courts had inquired.185 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court implied that evidence establish-
ing that posthumously conceived children needed protection might 
have influenced its decision.186  Because the district court is the ap-
propriate place to hear evidence and make findings of fact,187 once 
the Court identified an unexplored factual question, it should have 
remanded the case to the lower court to determine whether posthu-
mously conceived children are sufficiently similar to children born 
out of wedlock to be similarly classified as illegitimate.188 
C.  The Capato Court Erred by Applying Rational Basis Review 
Unfortunately, with little explanation, the Capato Court wrongly 
applied rational basis review, imposing a consequence on the Capato 
twins based on the family planning of their parents.189  As a result, the 
posthumously conceived Capato twins were doubly punished—first, in 
the denial of benefits and, second, in the level of scrutiny used to 
evaluate that denial.  Regarding illegitimate children, heightened 
scrutiny is appropriate where the policy or law in question indirectly 
punishes the child through no fault of his own but instead punishes 
the child because of the acts of his parents.190  While there is some in-
                                                        
 185.  See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
 186.  Cf. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2033 (2012) (“No showing has 
been made that posthumously conceived children share the characteristics that prompted 
our skepticism of classifications disadvantaging children of unwed parents.”). 
 187.  See supra notes 181–182 and accompanying text; see also Kennedy v. Silas Mason 
Co., 334 U.S. 249, 257 (1948) (“We consider it the part of good judicial administration to 
withhold decision of the ultimate questions involved in this case until this or another rec-
ord shall present a more solid basis of findings based on litigation or on a comprehensive 
statement of agreed facts.  While we might be able, on the present record, to reach a con-
clusion that would decide the case, it might well be found later to be lacking in the thor-
oughness that should precede judgment of this importance and which it is the purpose of 
the judicial process to provide.”). 
 188.  See supra notes 181–182. 
 189.  See supra text accompanying note 150. 
 190.  See supra Part II.B. 
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consistency regarding what level of scrutiny applies to such circum-
stances,191 scholars generally agree that laws discriminating on the ba-
sis of illegitimacy are subject to intermediate scrutiny.192  Contrary to 
the Supreme Court’s assertion in Capato, the two types of illegitimate 
children—those posthumously conceived and those born out of wed-
lock—whose difference lies only in their method and timing of con-
ception, are similarly situated and, thus, are both entitled to one of 
the few protections that comes with a title of illegitimacy: receiving in-
termediate scrutiny in equal protection claims. 
D.  In Its Abbreviated Equal Protection Analysis, the Capato Court Erred 
by Finding That the SSA’s Asserted Interests Were Legitimate and 
Passed the Rational Basis Test 
The Capato Court erred in affirming the SSA’s interpretation, 
which invoked state intestacy law and accepted a state determination 
of legitimacy in creating a presumption of dependency, without mak-
ing an inquiry into the constitutionality of the state law the SSA ap-
plied.193  Further, the Court’s determination that the SSA’s interests in 
using state intestacy law were legitimate was flawed and led to the in-
correct conclusion that the interpretation passed rational review.194 
                                                        
 191.  Compare Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 463–65 (1988) (applying intermediate scruti-
ny and requiring a “substantial relation” between the classification and the government 
interest); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769–72 (1977) (applying a heightened form of 
scrutiny and noting that no legitimate state interest justified the classification); Jimenez v. 
Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 631–33 (1974) (same); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 
164, 172−74 (1972) (same), with Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505−06, 509 (1976) (ap-
plying an unclear level of scrutiny that required a reasonable, but not a substantial, rela-
tion between the classification and the government interest).  For a criticism highlighting 
the Court’s failure to explain the applicable level of scrutiny used in Mathews, see Mathews, 
427 U.S. at 519–20 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 192.  See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
797–801 (4th ed. 2011) (“It is now clearly established that intermediate scrutiny is applied 
in evaluating laws that discriminate against nonmarital children . . . .”); JOHN E. NOWAK & 
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 453–54 (3d ed. 2007) (“Under 
the modern cases, the courts will uphold a governmental use of a classification based on 
the status of a person having been ‘legitimate’ or ‘illegitimate’ at birth only if the classifica-
tion is ‘substantially’ related to an ‘important’ government interest.”). 
 193.  See infra Part IV.D.1. 
 194.  See infra Part IV.D.2. 
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1.  The Court Failed to Determine the Purpose or Constitutionality of 
the State Law That the SSA Applied 
Under a rational basis analysis, a legitimate state interest must be 
consistent with the Constitution.195  The Capato Court wrongly allowed 
the SSA to rely on a stated purpose of administrative convenience to 
support its interpretation, while never considering the state’s reasons 
for establishing the law in the first instance.196  Posthumously con-
ceived children suffer a disparate impact regarding eligibility for sur-
vivor benefits because state intestacy laws determine legitimacy and 
generally classify posthumously conceived children as illegitimate, 
thereby denying these children a presumption of dependency under 
the Act.197  Once a disparate impact is identified, a court should evalu-
ate whether the state intestacy law shows any discriminatory intent or 
purpose.198 
The Capato Court, however, only evaluated the constitutionality 
of the “regime Congress adopted.”199  It made no inquiry into the 
purpose or constitutionality of the Florida law that the SSA applied.  
The question, therefore, of whether the state statute purposefully 
punished illegitimate children was never evaluated by the Supreme 
Court and never considered by the SSA before giving the law federal 
force in determinations of Social Security survivor benefits.  A con-
gressional statutory regime that allows the executive branch to give 
force to a state law without regard to its constitutionality is an arbi-
                                                        
 195.  See Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (“[I]f the constitutional 
concept of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean 
that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a 
legitimate governmental interest.”). 
 196.   Cf. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 518–23 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (opin-
ing that the presumptions of dependency in the Act violated equal protection because 
administrative convenience did not justify the overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness of 
the classifications).   
 197.  See Kindregan & McBrien, supra note 3, at 581, 586−87, 594  (highlighting the 
general absence of state intestacy laws that protect the inheritance rights of posthumously 
conceived children); see also Banks, supra note 163, at 259 (“[O]nly a few states have legis-
lation addressing the inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children. . . .  Because 
of the timing of the posthumously conceived child’s conception and birth, they are usually 
unable to establish either of these dependency standards.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 198.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 192, at 686–87.  
 199.  Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2033 (2012). 
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trary use of authority.200  Even though the Supreme Court and other 
federal courts have identified some state statutes as discriminating 
against illegitimate children,201 the SSA Program Operations Manual 
System (“POMS”) does not offer any guidance on what the SSA 
should do when state statutes discriminate against illegitimate chil-
dren.202  Because the POMS contains no requirement that the under-
lying state statute be consistent with the Constitution, the SSA is al-
lowed to enforce potentially unconstitutional state statutes.203  Blindly 
following state law, which is dispositive regarding whether posthu-
mously conceived children can receive survivor benefits, makes little 
sense either constitutionally or practically. 
                                                        
 200.  See REPUBLICAN STUDY COMM., RSC POLICY BRIEF: CONGRESS’S ROLE AND 
RESPONSIBILITY IN DETERMINING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LEGISLATION 1–2 (2012), 
available at http://rsc.scalise.house.gov/uploadedfiles/the_role_and_responsibility_of_ 
congress_in_determing_constitutionality_of_legislation.pdf (asserting that all three 
branches of government have the obligation to examine the constitutionality of the laws 
they pass and enforce).  
 201.  See, e.g., Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 852−53 (1986) (determining that a Texas 
intestacy statute was unconstitutional); Picket v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 3−7 (1983) (determin-
ing that a Tennessee paternity suit and support statute was unconstitutional); Mills v. 
Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 92–93, 99–100 (1982) (determining that a Texas paternity suit 
and support statute was unconstitutional); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 763, 766 
(1977) (determining that an Illinois intestacy statute was unconstitutional); Gomez v. Pe-
rez, 409 U.S. 535, 536–38 (1973) (per curiam) (determining that a Texas paternity support 
statute was unconstitutional); Daniels v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 1516, 1516–17, 1520–22 (11th 
Cir. 1992) (determining that a Georgia intestacy statute was unconstitutional as applied 
and interpreted by the SSA); Handley v. Schweiker, 697 F.2d 999, 1000–01, 1003–04 (11th 
Cir. 1983) (determining that an Alabama intestacy statute was unconstitutional as applied 
to an illegitimate child). 
 202.  See generally , Program Operations Manual System, GN 00306.075, State Laws on Legiti-
mation and Inheritance Rights, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/ 
0200306075#b (last visited Mar. 7, 2013). 
 203.  Cf. REPUBLICAN STUDY COMM., supra note 200, at 4 (“Inaction by Congress can 
have the effect of validating unconstitutional actions.  This inaction may then be followed 
as precedent.”). 
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2.  Through Its Application of Rational Basis Review, the Capato 
Court Erroneously Accepted the SSA’s Asserted Interests and 
Unsurprisingly Found a Reasonable Relationship Between the 
Means and the End 
The Capato Court upheld the SSA’s action based on the “twin in-
terests in [reserving] benefits [for] those children who have lost a 
parent’s support, and in using reasonable presumptions to minimize 
the administrative burden of proving dependency on a case-by-case 
basis.”204  Part of the problem with the Court applying rational basis 
review is that these asserted government interests were accepted as 
true.205  Under a proper intermediate scrutiny analysis, the asserted 
interests would have been open to the Court’s evaluation.206 
As to the SSA’s interest in “reserving benefits,” the Court should 
have concluded that, in light of the Act’s humanitarian goals, the Act 
warrants a liberal construction in favor of providing benefits.207  In-
deed, in the past, Congress has expanded coverage of the Act to pro-
vide benefits for illegitimate children.208  Similar to the sentiment ex-
pressed in Jimenez, however, the Capato Court should not have 
accepted the SSA’s reasoning without requiring the agency to provide 
evidence to support the contention that the Capato twins, and other 
posthumously conceived children, do not lose parental support.209  
                                                        
 204.  Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2033 (2012) (alteration in original) 
(citation omitted). 
 205.  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 192, at 700–01 (explaining that under rational basis 
review, the Court is deferential to the government’s asserted purpose regardless of wheth-
er the asserted purpose is the actual purpose) . 
 206.  See id. at 687 (noting that intermediate scrutiny is less deferential to the govern-
ment and explaining that the government has the burden of proof to demonstrate that its 
asserted interest is an important objective).  
 207.  See supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text. 
 208.  See e.g., SSR 66-47, 1966 WL 3044 (Jan. 1, 1966) (noting the status of illegitimate 
children under the Social Security Act Amendments of 1965 and how, in some cases, an 
illegitimate child can be a “child” under the Act and can thus be entitled to benefits); SSR 
67-59, 1967 WL 2995 (Jan. 1, 1967) (same); SSR 67-60, 1967 WL 2996 (Jan. 1, 1967) 
(same). 
 209.  See Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 633 (1974) (requiring “evidence [to] 
support[] the contention that to allow illegitimates in the classification of appellants to 
receive benefits would significantly impair” the ability of others to receive benefits); see also 
Louise Weinberg, A General Theory of Governance: Due Process and Lawmaking Power, 54 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1057, 1112 (2013) (“The Capato children had lost a parent’s support.  
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Again, had the Court applied intermediate scrutiny, the SSA would 
have had this burden of proof.210  Unfortunately, because the Court 
applied highly deferential rational basis review, it opined that the 
scheme must only be a reasonable means of accomplishing the assert-
ed goals,211 despite suggestions that the reasons and policy are both 
underinclusive and overinclusive.212 
As to the SSA’s interest in administrative convenience, the Su-
preme Court has traditionally scrutinized the propriety of administra-
tive efficiency as a legitimate goal when the consequence of the effi-
ciency harms an otherwise helpless class of citizens.213  Illegitimate 
                                                        
That they would have been dependent on Robert, had he survived, was conceded—there 
was no administrative burden in proving it.”). 
 210.  See supra note 206 and accompanying text. 
 211.  Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2033 (2012). 
 212.  See id. at 2032 (“[T]he intestacy criterion yields benefits to some children outside 
the Act’s central concern.”); see also Banks, supra note 163, at 346 (“There are no viable 
alternate considerations or means by which most posthumously conceived children can 
secure their entitlement to survivor’s benefits [unless these children can inherit through 
state intestacy law].  The statute as it stands is overinclusive in that children who may not 
be actually dependent are presumed dependent, and underinclusive due to the total ex-
clusion of after-conceived children who have no statutory opportunity in which to prove 
dependency on a deceased parent.”).  In Capato, if the Court applied intermediate scruti-
ny, it is unlikely that the Court would have found a substantial relation between the gov-
ernment interests and the classification because the underinclusiveness and overinclusive-
ness would likely not be tolerated.  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 192, at 689–90 (explaining 
that when evaluating the fit between the government’s purpose and the means used to 
achieve that purpose, the stricter the level of scrutiny applied by the Court, the less toler-
ance there is for overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness). 
 213.  See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 519−20 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criti-
cizing the Court’s acceptance of administrative convenience and noting that illegitimacy-
based classifications demand justification “by a weightier governmental interest than mere-
ly ‘administrative convenience’”); Banks, supra note 163, at 348−49 (asserting that because 
of computer and Internet technology modernization since the Mathews decision in 1976, 
there is great doubt as to whether the government interest of administrative convenience 
“could substantiate the statutory exclusion of nonmarital, posthumously conceived chil-
dren”); see also I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) (“[T]the fact that a given law or 
procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, 
standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.  Convenience and effi-
ciency are not the primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of democratic govern-
ment . . . .”).  But see Mathews, 427 U.S. at 509 (majority opinion) (stating that “[s]uch pre-
sumptions in aid of administrative functions, though they may approximate, rather than 
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children are a class that has been historically discriminated against by 
states in assigning intestacy rights and government benefits.214  This 
history was essentially ignored in Capato because the Capato twins’ il-
legitimacy—posthumous conception—was different than the tradi-
tional type of illegitimacy—conception and birth out of wedlock dur-
ing the parents’ lifetimes.  In Jimenez, however, the Court concluded 
that the state cannot rely on a government interest in preventing spu-
rious claims to deprive children of the opportunity to receive bene-
fits.215  The Jimenez Court found that where the state effectively “denies 
[children] any opportunity to prove dependency,” the rationale can-
not be the prevention of spurious claims.216  This sentiment was also 
echoed by the three dissenters in Mathews.217  Finding no “relevant dif-
ference between Jimenez and [Mathews],” Justice Stevens stated: 
 In Jimenez the Secretary told the Court that the classifica-
tion was “designed only to prevent spurious claims.”  The 
Court held that objective insufficient to justify “the blanket 
and conclusive exclusion” of a subclass of illegitimates.  The 
statute has not changed but now we are told that the justifi-
cation for a similar blanket and conclusive exclusion is “ad-
ministrative convenience.” I suggest that this is merely a dif-
ferent name for the same federal interest.218 
Justice Stevens further reasoned that, like the government interest of 
preventing spurious claims, the government interest of administrative 
convenience should not be relied on as a rationale for depriving ille-
gitimate children the opportunity to prove dependency.219 
What the Capato Court failed to recognize was that, while the Act 
provides additional ways for a child applicant to qualify for survivor 
insurance benefits,220 posthumously conceived children are unable to 
                                                        
precisely mirror, the results that case-by-case adjudication would show, are permissible un-
der the Fifth Amendment, so long as that lack of precise equivalence does not exceed the bounds of 
substantiality tolerated by the applicable level of scrutiny” (emphasis added)).  
 214.  See supra Parts IV.A.1–2. 
 215.  Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 635–37 (1974). 
 216.  Id. 
 217.  Mathews, 427 U.S. at 518−20, 523 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 218.  Id. at 518 (internal citations omitted). 
 219.  See id. at 519 (“It seems rather plain . . . that . . . the classification is invalid unless it 
is justified by a weightier governmental interest than merely ‘administrative conven-
ience.’”). 
 220.  See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
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meet any of those criteria.221  Indeed, the SSA and the Fourth Circuit 
have explicitly recognized that posthumously conceived children can-
not meet any of these additional requirements and are, therefore, to-
tally excluded from obtaining survivor benefits unless they qualify un-
der state intestacy law.222  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court failed to 
notice this, and its decision in Capato allowed the exclusion of post-
humously conceived children to perpetuate for the asserted purpose 
of administrative convenience. 
Arguably, even under rational basis review, the illegitimacy-based 
classifications are not reasonably related to the administrative conven-
ience of using state intestacy law to prevent case-by-case survivor bene-
fits determinations.  The SSA is actually set up to review benefits on a 
case-by-case basis.223  Indeed, the SSA has its own legal staff, adminis-
trative law judges, and Appeals Council.224  In 2012, the SSA individu-
ally reviewed over five million retirement, survivorship, and Medicare 
claims.225  Also in 2012, the SSA stated that it “has received more than 
one hundred claims for survivor benefits by posthumously conceived 
                                                        
 221.  See Banks, supra note 163, at 346 (“There are no viable alternate considerations or 
means by which most posthumously conceived children can secure their entitlement to 
survivor’s benefits.”). 
 222.  Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 53 (4th Cir. 2011) (“The insured parent of such a 
[posthumously conceived] child by definition died prior to the child’s conception, and 
therefore parentage could not have been acknowledged or decreed prior to death, nor 
could the applicant have been living with or receiving contributions from the decedent 
when the decedent passed away.”), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2680 (2012).  The SSA has stated 
that “[t]hese additional tests for eligibility require action by the insured during the life-
time of the child.”  SSAR 05-1(9), 70 Fed. Reg. 55,656, 55,657 n.3 (Sept. 22, 2005). 
 223.  See Survivor’s Planner: How You Apply for Survivor’s Benefits, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., 
http://www.ssa.gov/survivorplan/howtoapply.htm#ht=1 (last visited Feb. 5, 2013) (detail-
ing the individual information and documents needed to apply for survivor benefits and 
noting that “[s]ince every person’s situation is different, you cannot apply for survivors 
benefits online”); see generally SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN., ONLINE SOCIAL SECURITY 
HANDBOOK (2012), available at http://ssa.gov/OP_Home/handbook/handbook.html 
(explaining the process for filing claims with the SSA). 
 224.  Organizational Structure of the Social Security Administration, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN. 
(2012), available at http://www.ssa.gov/org/ssachart.pdf. 
 225.  SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN. PERFORMANCE SECTION, SSA’S FY 2012 PERFORMANCE 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 73 (2012), available at http://www.socialsecurity.gov/ 
finance/2012/Complete%20Performance%20Section.pdf. 
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children, with claims increasing significantly in recent years.”226  As-
suming that there were 100 child survivor claims from posthumously 
conceived children in 2012 alone, these numbers indicate that only 
about .002%, or 100 out of 5,000,000, of the claims are from posthu-
mously conceived children seeking survivor benefits.  If, however, the 
cumulative total of child survivor claims is 100, then the percentage of 
SSA survivor benefits claims from posthumously conceived children is 
even lower.  Given these figures, one must wonder whether it would 
really be that administratively inconvenient for these claims to be con-
sidered on a case-by-case basis.  Probably not.  It is therefore difficult 
to find a reasonable relationship between the means and the end.  To 
be sure, scholars have begun to find the Court’s reasoning in Capato 
“an offense to justice as well as reason.”227  If the Capato Court had 
been presented with this information, perhaps it would have found 
that, even under the rational basis test, the government’s contention 
lacked merit.  Moreover, if the Court had properly applied intermedi-
ate scrutiny, then the SSA’s use of state intestacy law would fail an 
equal protection analysis because even if the asserted government in-
terests were found to be important, they are not substantially related to 
achieving the purpose of administrative convenience. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Astrue v. Capato, the Supreme Court addressed the SSA’s ille-
gitimacy-based classification and use of state intestacy law in determin-
ing whether posthumously conceived children are eligible for Social 
Security survivor benefits.228  In determining that the SSA’s use of state 
intestacy law was consistent with the statute’s textual meaning and 
purpose and was entitled only to rational basis review,229 the Supreme 
Court demonstrated that it has not yet accepted posthumously con-
ceived children as deserving of the protection of other illegitimate 
                                                        
 226.  James Vicini, U.S. Top Court Decides In Vitro Fertilization Benefits, REUTERS, May 21, 
2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/21/us-usa-socialsecurity-benefits-idUSBR 
E84K0SD20120521. 
 227.   Weinberg, supra note 209, at 1113; see also id. at 1112 (“[I]t is hard to see why dis-
crimination against a subclass of posthumously born infants is more justifiable than dis-
crimination against all posthumously born infants, when the subclass has no rational rela-
tion to the child.  No amount of creative subclassing can save Astrue [v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 
2021 (2012)] from its denial of equal protection.”). 
 228.  See supra Part III. 
 229.  See supra notes 127−128, 149−150 and accompanying text. 
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children, even though both sets of children are unfairly impacted be-
cause of the decisions of their parents. 
Instead of protecting the rights of these innocent children, the 
Court’s equal protection review mistakenly used a highly deferential 
rational basis test that failed to honor its precedent and improperly 
allowed a federal agency to enforce state laws without regard to those 
laws’ constitutionality.230  If the Court believed that posthumously 
conceived children may not qualify as illegitimate children under the 
law, then the Court should have remanded the case to the district 
court to allow the parties to present evidence on whether these chil-
dren are a different subcategory of illegitimate children not entitled 
to heightened scrutiny.231  Ultimately, the Court should have applied 
intermediate scrutiny,232 but it should not have been so easily per-
suaded that the SSA’s asserted purposes were legitimate, even under 
the rational basis test.233  Until the Supreme Court honors the prece-
dent of its own jurisprudence and applies intermediate scrutiny to 
these discriminatory classifications, posthumously conceived children 
will continue to be regarded as second-class citizens and denied equal 
protection for reasons beyond their control. 
                                                        
 230.  See supra Part IV.A, D.1. 
 231.  See supra Part IV.B. 
 232.  See supra Part IV.C. 
 233.  See supra Part IV.D. 
